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PARTY AUTONOMY IN
INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
CONSOLIDATION OF
MULTIPARTY AND
CLASSWIDE ARBITRATION

OKUMA KAZUTAKE*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Dispute settlement is an important area in international contract and
trade. Settlement either by litigation in court or by alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) is contemplated by contractual parties in international
transactions. Each system presents its own problems.
Effective litigation requires a judge to be an impartial, legal expert;
however, is that always true, especially in the international context? A
party litigating in another country is often concerned about whether he
can achieve a fair judgment there. Decisions can sometimes be based on
patriotic or parochial grounds, and even if a party receives a fair
judgment, will he be able to enforce it in the other country?
While litigation is a fundamental right of citizens under the constitutions
of most countries nowadays, in civil cases there are alternatives. It is
possible to settle a dispute by an ADR method, but only if the parties to

* Professor of Law, Seinan Gakuin University, Fukuoka, Japan. SJ.D. Candidate, Golden
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the dispute have clearly and effectively agreed to ADR, thereby implying
a waiver of litigation.
A.

ARBITRATION

Arbitration is the usual ADR mechanism that is used for dispute
settlement in international commercial transactions. In contrast to the
public nature of litigation, arbitration is a private and closed procedure
limited to the parties concerned. In considering the relationship between
litigation and arbitration, there is also a need to refer to the role of the
state court in arbitration, particularly regarding the extent of assistance
and intervention in the process of arbitration and enforcement of awards.
Arbitration officially recognized. In the U.S. the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) was enacted in 1925, "to overrule the judiciary's longstanding
refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate" and secures arbitration in
accordance with the terms agreed by the parties. Therefore, an
arbitration agreement is an indispensable requirement. An arbitration
agreement can either be entered into with a primary transaction
agreement such as a sales or construction agreement, or can be included
as an arbitration clause in the primary agreement.
A fundamental premise of arbitration is the necessity for the parties to
agree to arbitrate a dispute rather than proceed to litigation. An arbitral
award is final and binding.
Arbitration has also been recognized by the international business
community as a useful and important device for resolving disputes. The
arbitrators are private individuals selected by the parties on a case-bycase basis. An arbitrator is usually a specialist in the field of dispute,
such as an engineer for building and construction disputes, an accountant
for monetary disputes, and a medical doctor for medical malpractice. In
almost all cases, however, a lawyer is also selected as one of the
arbitrators.
B.

EXPANDING PARTY AUTONOMY

As mentioned, arbitration is a private dispute settlement mechanism. In
contrast to litigation with a judge acting as a state organ, arbitration is
settled by a private individual. However, does an arbitrator have the
necessary power to settle all cases? The arbitrator is delegated authority
by the parties who select the arbitrator. Within the ambit of the
delegated authority, the arbitrator can exercise the discretion for settling
disputes. Even within this ambit, however, the arbitrator is under some
limitation by law and public policy. Where is the line set dividing these
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol9/iss1/9
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limits from the agreement of the parties and discretion of the arbitrator?
Taking into consideration recent case law, this line is moving, and the
sphere of party autonomy is gradually expanding.
But how is this expansion taking place? More specifically, how are
regulatory statutes and public policy being relaxed to govern arbitration
in such fields as antitrust laws, securities regulations, RICO, patent acts,
taxes, punitive damages, bankruptcy, labor, the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act (COGSA), and others? By reviewing many aspects of case law,
particularly by focusing on u.S. case law, these tendencies can be
scrutinized. I

c.

CONSOLIDATING ARBITRATION

An arbitration agreement is usually made by two parties such as a seller
and buyer in a sales agreement, an owner and contractor, or a contractor
and subcontractor in a construction agreement. In the case of a
construction project, if a subcontractor claims against a contractor to
extend the completion date in an arbitration between the two parties, the
contractor will not determine by itself because it relates to the
completion date in the prime contract with the owner. The contractor
then asks the owner to participate in the arbitration between the
contractor and the subcontractor. The owner may refuse to participate in
the arbitration because the owner he did not agree to arbitration with the
subcontractor, though the owner agreed to arbitration with the contractor.
The facts and the law may be similar in the two arbitrations, and if they
are consolidated, a conclusion can be reached in one procedure.
Otherwise, with separate arbitration procedures, different conclusions
may be reached.
In such a case, if one party asks the court to consolidate the arbitration
between the owner and the contractor, and the arbitration between the
contractor and the subcontractor, how does the court decide the case?
Does the court agree to consolidate the arbitrations or deny
consolidation? In the U.S., there is no uniform procedure; some states
allow consolidation under a state act, and others. Most state and federal
courts require an agreement by parties on consolidation of arbitration.
The parties themselves decide the method and scope of arbitration; party
autonomy is recognized.

I. This article, which is one chapter of a doctoral dissertation on party autonomy in
international commercial arbitration, will discuss multiparty and classwide arbitration, which is only
one area of within the scope of the dissertation.
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CLASSWIDE ARBITRATION

Classwide arbitration is a counterpart of class action in litigation, and is a
kind of extended style of multiparty arbitration, which usually involves
fewer than ten parties. On the other hand, there may be a great many
members, such as 800, involved in classwide arbitration. As in a class
action, many arrangements need to be made in classwide arbitration.
Should the parties set all requirements and procedures? These details
require scrutiny; sometimes court involvement may be necessary.
II.

CONSOLIDATION OF ARBITRATION IN MULTIPARTY
ARBITRATION

With regard to multiparty arbitration, first, three cases of the U.S.,2 U.K. 3
and France4 will be reviewed, and then the tendencies of U.S. case law
will be examined.
A.

THE BOEING CASES (U.S. SECOND CIRCUIT)

The U.S. courts have not uniformly decided on the consolidation of
arbitration. The case law of federal circuit courts, especially, the Second
Circuit, differs from those of other circuit courts. The Second Circuit
has held that the court has authority to compel consolidation of
arbitration where the facts and the law are common to the cases. Other
courts do not permit consolidation of arbitration unless the parties agreed
to the consolidation.
The First Circuit permits consolidation of
arbitration under a state act. In 1993, the Second Circuit issued the
Boeing case, which overruled former precedent.
The facts of Boeing are as follows: An accident occurred during the test
run of the electric fuel control devices of a military helicopter of the UK
Government. The devices, which were designed and manufactured by
Textron Inc., were installed in the helicopter manufactured by Boeing.
The UK Government has two separate long-term contracts for
developing military projects with Boeing and Textron Inc. with
arbitration agreements, which are similar provisions subject to the
arbitration rules of American Arbitration Association (AAA) by three
2.
United Kingdom v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1993).
3.
Erith Contractors Ltd v Costain Civil Engineering Ltd., [1994] ADR U 123 Official
Referees His Honour Judge John Loyd Q.C., unreported; White & Case, 7 lNT'L ARBITRATION
NEWSLETTER I, 11 (J an. 1994).
4.
Siemens AG and BKMI Industrienlagen GmbH v. Dutco Consortium Constr. Co., Casso
Civ.7 Jan. 1992 (French Cour de Cassation); 119 J. DROIT lNT'L (CLUNET) 712 (1992); 1992 REV.
ARB. 479 (1992) (commented by Pierre Bellet at 473-82; 18 Y.B. COM. ARB. 140 (1993).
5.
See Boeing, 998 F.2d at 68.
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arbitrators, the place of arbitration being New York. Two years after the
accident, the UK Government filed arbitration with AAA claiming
damages against two companies. Before and after filing the arbitration,
the UK Government asked the two companies to agree on consolidation
of arbitration, but Boeing would not agree to it, considering that the cost
would increase in the consolidation and the problem would be simpler in
the case of independent proceedings. AAA notified the UK Government
that it would not consolidate arbitration unless all parties agreed to do so.
The UK Government filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York to compel consolidation of arbitration. The
District Court admitted the filing based on the case law of the Second
Circuit and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) and dismissed
the motion filed by Boeing. There was no further action taken in this
case.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit distinguished this case from
the Nereus case,6 which the District Court referred to as precedent. In
the Nereus case, after the signing of a Charter Party agreement between a
ship owner and a charterer, there was a memorandum, agreed to by the
owner, charterer and guarantor, which referred to the Charter Party with
an arbitration clause. Therefore, the court interpreted that three parties
agreed on a single arbitration. However, there were two separate
agreements between the UK Government and Boeing, and between the
UK Government and Textron Inc., and neither agreement contained a
provision of to consolidate arbitration. Neither Boeing nor Textron Inc.
agreed to participate in another party's arbitration procedure. The
District Court does not have the authority to consolidate two arbitrations
based merely on the fact that the dispute contains the same or similar
facts and legal issues.
The UK Government made its claim based on the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) and the PRCP. The Second Circuit has held that PRCP 42(a)
and 8I(a) (3)7 apply to consolidation of arbitration, and liberal
interpretation of the purpose of the FAA clearly allows, and in fact
recommends, consolidation of arbitration. Recent decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court, however, question this conclusion, which is no longer
correct law. The FAA does not admit consolidation of arbitration

6.
Compania Espanola de Petroleos v. Nereus Shipping, 527 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1975).
7.
FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a): "Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law
or fact are pending before the court, [ ... J it may order all the actions consolidated ... ;" FED. R. Crv.
P. 81 (a)(3): "In proceedings under Title 9, U.S.c., relating to arbitration, [ ... J these rules apply only
to the extent that matters of procedure are not provided for in those statutes."
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without a provision in the agreement. The claim by the UK Government
regarding Articles 42(a) and Sl(a) (3) of the FRCP is not correct. Article
8I(a) (3) of the FRCP only allows application of the FRCP in court
proceedings when the FAA brings the case and does not stipulate to a
procedure. It is apparent that 81(a) (3) of the FRCP is interpreted so that
the FRCP does not apply to a private arbitration procedure pending
under the FAA procedure.
The U.S. Supreme Court has concluded, by referring to three previous
decisions, that the FAA intended only to secure enforcement of a
privately negotiated agreement, even though enforcement was
inefficient. The FAA, in sum, does not always order arbitration
regarding a claim, but enforces the filing of a privately negotiated
agreement even though the result may be a piecemeal procedure.
The UK Government was concerned that inefficiency and inconsistency
would result from separate arbitration procedures. However, contractual
parties may stipulate to consolidation of arbitration in an arbitration
clause if they wish to settle disputes arising out of the same facts through
a single arbitration procedure.
The Second Circuit held that the district court may not consolidate
arbitrations arising from separate arbitration clauses to a contract, where
there is no clause permitting consolidation of arbitration in the parties'
agreement. The court scrutinized the precedent of the Second Circuit
and other circuits, and mentioned that the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits do not compel consolidation of arbitration unless the
parties agree to consolidate.
In this decision, the Second Circuit changed its case law which
compelled consolidation of arbitration by a court even if there was no
agreement by the parties to consolidate.
B.

THE ERITH CASES (UK HIGH COURT)

A dispute arose regarding the fulfillment of an engineering subcontract
in a construction contract. The prime contract stipulated the terms of a

8. Erith Contractors Ud v Costain Civil Engineering Ud., [1994] ADR U 123 Official
Referees His Honour Judge John Loyd Q.c., supra note 3.
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contract of the Fifth Edition of the English Institution of Civil Engineers
(ICE),9 and the subcontract also used the ICE terms for civil works.
The subcontractor sued contractor for delay in payment and collapse of
land on the construction site. The contractor also sued the owner for an
extension of time and additional payment, and asked the engineer to
decide under the prime contract, which was conditioned on filing
arbitration.
Clause 18 of the subcontract was an arbitration clause, which stipulated
that a single arbitrator be selected by the parties, and if the parties do not
so agree, the Chairman of ICE would appoint the arbitrator. The subclause stipulated that
if any dispute arises in connection with the main contract and the
contractor is of the opinion that such dispute touches or concerns
the subcontract works, then provided that an arbitrator has not
already been agreed or appointed in pursuance of the preceding
sub-clause, the contractor may by notice in' writing to the
subcontractor require that any such dispute under this
subcontract shall be dealt with jointly with the dispute under the
main contract in accordance with the provisions of clause 66
thereof. In connection with such joint dispute the subcontractor
shall be bound in like manner as the contractor by any decision
of the engineer or any award by an arbitrator.
The contractor claimed that almost all disputes under the prime contract
related to the subcontract, and problems under the subcontract would be
settled at the same time as problems under the prime contract; however,
the contractor agreed to select an arbitrator, and one was selected. The
subcontractor asked the Chairman of the ICE to appoint an arbitrator
regarding disputes under the subcontract, but the Chairman of ICE did
not do so. The subcontractor then asked the High Court to appoint an
arbitrator and to declare that the arbitrator had jurisdiction of the
arbitrator over the dispute relating to the subcontract.
The Court found that a dispute had arisen regarding the prime contract,
the contractor had been notified of the dispute under Clause 66, and had
then requested joint settlement of the dispute under the subcontract. At
the time of notice the arbitrator had not yet been selected regarding the
9.
Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE), The Federation of Civil Engineering Contractor's
Form of Subcontract, ICE CONDITIONS OF CONTRACf (7th ed. 1999), available at
http://www.ice.org.uk (last visited Feb 24, 2003).
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dispute under the subcontract. The Court held, therefore, that a
contractor could claim three-party arbitration regarding a dispute under
the prime contract which relates to a subcontract. The Court allowed
multiparty arbitration with appropriate notice pursuant to the contract.

C.

THE DUTCO CASE \0 (FRENCH COUR DE CASSA nON)

BKMI, a German company, entered into a tum-key contract for
construction of a cement production plant in Oman, and formed a
consortium with Dutco, UAB, and Siemens, Germany, to share the work.
The arbitration clause of the consortium agreement provided that all
disputes arising in connection with the agreement which were not settled
amicably should be settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) by three arbitrators appointed
in accordance with the Rules. The place of arbitration would be Paris.
Dutco filed against two German companies for default of performance
under the contract, for arbitration with ICC under the arbitration clause,
claiming separate payment from each company. BKMI and Siemens
opposed a single arbitration procedure, and requested separate
proceedings.
ICC decided to proceed by a single arbitral tribunal with three
arbitrators, with one arbitrator selected by Dutco, and one by BKMI and
Siemens jointly. Two German companies, though reserving a right of
opposition, selected one arbitrator. The third arbitrator was appointed by
the President of ICC. By the time of the interim award, the ICC
confirmed that arbitration proceedings had begun appropriately, and
were allowed to proceed with multiparty arbitration.
BKMI and Siemens filed in the Cour d'Appel of Paris to vacate the
arbitral award, claiming irregularity of composition of the arbitral
tribunal, and that recognition and enforcement of the award were against
international public policy.
The Cour d'Appel of Paris dismissed the filing, reasoning that the Rules
of Arbitration of the ICC did not preclude the possibility of multiparty
arbitration. By agreeing to the consortium, the parties created close
cooperation and, as a result, permitted the possibility of multiparty
arbitration. Clause 2(4) of the Rules of Arbitration of ICC stipulates that
each party should select one arbitrator. The right of each party to select
10.
Siemens AG & BKMI Industrienlagen GmbH V. Dutco Consortium Constr. Co., Cass. ass.
ph!n., Jan. 7, 1992 (French Cour de Cassation); 119 J. DROIT INT'L (CLUNET) 712 (1992); 1992 REV.
ARB. 479 (1992) (commented by Pierre Bellet at 473-82; 18 Y.B. COM. ARB. 140 (1993).
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its "own" arbitrator is fundamental but not absolute. In this case, there
was no clear imbalance in exercising the right to compose the arbitral
tribunal. It was not against the principle of equal treatment of the parties
or public policy. Multiparty arbitration, by its nature, is not
inconvenient, and does not affect equal treatment of the parties or
domestic and international rules of public policy. The court decided that
the arbitral tribunal was composed properly through the intent of the
parties and the ICC Rules. The plaintiff, appealed.
The Cour de Cassation (the Supreme Court) reversed the decision of the
Cour d'Appel, finding that the arbitration clause by which the parties
clearly expressed their intent to refer a dispute under the contract to three
arbitrators, permitted the possibility of a single arbitral tribunal
consisting of three arbitrators. This finding, however, was against the
provision of the act. I I The court referred to the provisions of the act
which did not allow proceedings by an irregularly composed arbitral
tribunal, or waiver by private agreement or public policy considerations,
and decided that the principle of equality of the parties for selecting the
arbitrator may be waived only after a dispute arises.
D.

ISSUES RAISED IN THE PRECEDING THREE CASES

The decisions rendered by the three countries discussed above relate to
multiparty arbitration. The specific issues were different, but the
ultimate issues were the same. The issues raised are discussed below.
In the U.S. case, although Boeing and Textron Inc. participated in the
project of the UK Government, the contracts were concluded separately
by each company, and the arbitration clause in each contract was the
same, but neither contract contained a provision of consolidation of
arbitration. After the accident occurred, the UK Government asked both
companies to agree on consolidation of arbitration, but they refused to do
so.
Based on this fact, the court decided it did not have the authority to
consolidate arbitration simply because of the same or similar facts and
legal issues involved in the dispute. In other words, the court concluded
that, whereas the parties did not intend to consolidate arbitration, the
court could not compel it.
In the UK case there was a prime contract and a subcontract involved in
the project, and the dispute settlement clause in the subcontract stipulated
11.

[d.
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that when a dispute arose out of the prime contract related to the
subcontract, the prime contractor could ask the subcontractor to settle the
dispute jointly. In particular, there was an expression of "any dispute"
under the subcontract, and there was also a procedure regarding notice of
occurrence of a dispute before selection of an arbitrator.
The court considered the background and spirit of the dispute settlement
clause in the subcontract, and found the intention of the parties to be
avoidance of dispute settlement for both the prime contract and the
subcontract. The expression of any dispute under the subcontract could
be interpreted so that when a dispute arising under the prime contract
relates to a dispute under the subcontract in accordance with the
conditions of the prime contract, joint settlement can be requested. The
court found that when a dispute arose under the prime contract, and the
notice requirement was satisfied, the prime contractor may ask the owner
and subcontractor for a single arbitration by the three parties.
The critical issue was therefore what did the parties agree in the
contracts? The court recognized the agreement of the parties, and
decided to authorize multiparty arbitration.
In the French case, BKMI contracted with the Oman owner and

subcontracted with Dutco and Siemens; however, they established a
consortium to share the work. As the arbitration was filed by Dutco,
BKMI and Siemens were in the position of respondents. Under the
Rules of ICC, in the case of three arbitrators, the claimant and
respondent nominate one arbitrator each, with the third to be appointed
by ICC, unless the parties have agreed otherwise. As BKMI and
Siemens became respondents, the two companies were to jointly
nominate one arbitrator. BKMI and Siemens claimed they were entitled
to separate arbitrations, and that each had the right to nominate one
arbitrator apiece. ICC did not allow their claim, stating that if they did
not nominate one arbitrator, according to the Rules, ICC would appoint
the arbitrator.
The Cour d'Appel (the Court of Appeals) affirmed, but the Cour de
Cassation (the Supreme Court) reversed, reasoning that the principle of
equality of the parties in selecting the arbitrator was an issue of public
policy.
Thus, the ultimate issue in the above cases is the same: What is the
intent of the parties? When the parties agree on consolidation of
arbitration, the court will respect their intent and allow consolidation of
arbitration.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol9/iss1/9

10

Kazutake: Int'l. Commercial Arbitration

2003]

INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

199

May a court compel consolidation of arbitration even if the intent of the
parties is not clear? When the intent of the parties is not clear, separate
proceedings are required from parties whose intent is clear. But if the
conclusions from the separate proceedings become different, then how
should the situation be considered? It might be better and more efficient
to settle the cases jointly when there are facts and legal issues in
common. This issue will be examined later with reference to U.S. case
law.
The French court held in Dutco that the content of the parties' agreement
was against public policy, and that practices under the ICC rules were
against the rules in France. Moreover, the principle of the equality of the
parties was public policy and could not be waived before a dispute arose.
This was shocking, considering the status of the ICC in the area of
international commercial arbitration. An arbitration clause is usually
negotiated and agreed upon at the time of concluding the underlying
contract (as in a sales or construction contract) and is included in the
contract; so as it naturally is concluded before a dispute arises, this type
of waiver is in vain.
The French court decision in the Dutco case has been criticized by many
commentators. Seppala12 mentioned that ICC arbitration rules require an
arbitrator to be independent from the party who selected him or her. The
party who selects the arbitrator expects the arbitrator to sympathize with
that party. If a party is deprived of the right to select an arbitrator, or
given a lesser right than another party, the first party may believe he is
prejudiced. The principle of equal treatment in selecting an arbitrator
does not necessarily mean that each party has a right to select each
arbitrator; rather it is implied that each party has an equal right to the
procedure of composing the arbitral tribunal. Sooner or later the
Supreme Court will limit this decision to the particular facts of the Dutco
case, recognizing that the principle of equal rights applied in this case is
extreme. That is the desire of French commentators. This decision will
be against the case law decided by the Supreme Court over twenty years
in favor of international commercial arbitration. The unavailability of
the equal right to select an arbitrator after a dispute arises is reminiscent
a case of 150 years ago,13 where an arbitration clause could not be
enforced unless the name of the arbitrator and the dispute were

12. Christopher Seppala, French Supreme Coun Nullifies ICC Practice for Appointment of
Arbitrator in Multi-Pany Arbitration Cases, 10 INT'L CONSTR. L.REv. 2, 222 (1993).
13. L'Alliance v. Prunier, Cour de Cassation (Chambre Civile), juillet 10, 1843, 1843 Bull.
Civ. I, No. 10.
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identified. Seppala admits, however, that the Supreme Court's limiting
application of this principle may be risky.
ICC has been examining the issue of multiparty arbitration. Regarding
the Dutco case, Mr. Schwartz,14 then Secretary General of ICC, offered
his private opinion that the Dutco decision did well in establishing the
equal treatment of the parties in composing an arbitral tribunal; however,
it is unfortunate that it frustrated promotion of multiparty arbitration.
The case influenced the drafting of agreements and the established
practices of the ICC. Though only one section l5 of the Rules of the ICC
allows for the possibility of multiparty arbitration, about 20% of the
cases filed each year involve multiparty arbitration, and two-thirds of
pending cases are arbitrated outside of France. He also mentions that
consideration of filing of arbitration depends on whether it occurs inside
or outside of France, and it is a matter of course to treat the party equally
in composing the arbitral tribunal. It is critical to consider the
arbitration by interpreting the parties' agreement, i.e., whether it calls
for single or multiparty arbitration, and the substance of the Dutco case
should not be overlooked. If the parties agree on multiparty arbitration,
they must so stipulate clearly in the agreement.
Regarding composition of the arbitral tribunal under the ICC Rules of
Arbitration, Westland case l6 rendered in Switzerland should be
examined. This case should also be considered from the viewpoint of the
relationship between the procedures under the arbitration rules of the
arbitration institution and the statutes of the place of arbitration.
However, in this paper, only the present subject will be considered.

14.
Eric A. Schwartz, Multi-Party Arbitration and the ICC in the Wake of Dutco, 10 I. INT'L
ARB. 3, 5 (1993). It is obvious from the ICC publication that ICC has been scrutinizing multi-party
arbitration for many years recognizing that it is a problem. ICC Guide to Multi-Party Arbitration
(ICC Publication No. 404/1, 1982). Dossier of the Institute of International Business Law and
Practice, Multi-Party Arbitration (ICC Publication No. 480/1, 1991). The ICC scrutinized multiparty
arbitration at the Working Committee of International Arbitration Committee and published its final
report in April 1994.
15.
1988 INT'L. CHAMBER COM. R. ARB., art. 30(3) (Advance to Cover Costs of the
Arbitration). "The advance on costs shall be payable in equal shares by the Claimant or Claimants
and the Defendant or Defendants."
16.
Westland Helicopters Ltd. (UK) v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Arab Organization for
Industrialization, Arab British Helicopter Co. (Egypt), Tribunal Federal, 10 Sept. 1985, 24
Sept. 1986, reported in ATF 112, Ia 344, 109 La Semaine Judiciaire 1(1987), xn YB
Cornrn.Arb'n(1987) at 186, and ICC Interim award of 5 March 1984 in case No.3879, Westland
Helicopters Ltd. (UK) v. Arab Organization for Industrialization, United Arab Emirates, Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, State of Qatar, Arab Republic of Egypt and Arab British Helicopter Co. (Egypt), in
23 I.L.M. 1071 (1984), 11 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 127 (1986). Swiss Federal Tribunal, May 16, 1993.89
ILM 687 (1989). Note, Swiss Tribunal says it may rule on competence of ICC arbitrator, I Int.
Arb. Rep. 435 (1986).
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Four countries, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Qatar
and Egypt established the Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI),
with its head office in Cairo, and a branch office in Riyadh. AOI is
under the control of the Administration Committee consisting of
Ministers as representatives of four countries. The Administration
Committee and the UK Government wrote a memorandum guaranteeing
an agreement to be executed by and between the four countries and an
English company. In the next month, the four countries and the English
company, Westland, executed a joint venture agreement and established
Arab British Helicopter Co. (Egypt)(ABH). Under the arbitration clause
in the joint venture agreement, the place of arbitration was to be Geneva,
Switzerland, with the governing law to be the laws of Switzerland. After
execution of the agreement, the Camp David agreement was reached by
Egypt and Israel, and UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar announced their
intent to dissolve AOI. Egypt, however, issued a decree declaring the
AOI's continuation.
Westland filed arbitration with ICC claiming damages against AOI, four
member countries, and ABH. The arbitral tribunal was composed of
three arbitrators. 17 No respondent other than Egypt and ABH attended the
proceedings, and these two respondents filed a motion objecting to the
jurisdiction of the tribunal. EAOI, though it was not named a respondent,
attended the proceedings, to which Westland filed an objection. The
tribunal stated in June 1982 that EAOI was not a respondent, and
rendered an interim decree in March 1984 that the tribunal had
jurisdiction over the parties as set forth in the filing. The Court of
Appeals in Geneva vacated the decision of the tribunal as of June 1982,
and remanded to the tribunal for reconsideration. Egypt and others filed
in court for dismissal of the arbitrators based on Article 40 of the Swiss
Arbitration Accord. 18 The Swiss Supreme Court decided in September
1985 that the Canton court had jurisdiction over dismissal of the
arbitrator.
Westland filed in the Supreme Court requesting trial on Articles 32 and
40 (4) of the Swiss Arbitration Accord, and confirmation of continuation
of the arbitrator. The Supreme Court examined the history of the
legislation and reasoning of Article 40 (4), and decided it was applicable
17. The three arbitrators were a judge of the Supreme Court in Paris, Pierre Bellet; a judge of
Stockholm, Nils Mangard; and a Professor from Berne, Eugene Bucher, who also served as
chairman of the tribunal.
18. Concordat sur \'arbitrage du 27 mars 1969, RO 1969 1117, Art. 40 (Prononce). The Swiss
Arbitration Accord, Article 40: Where the award is annulled, the arbitrator shall rehear the case;
unless objection is made on the ground that they participated in the previous proceedings, or on
some other ground.
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only in the event of an annulment of the final award. This was not such
a case.
Regarding multiparty arbitration in the interim award rendered by the
arbitral tribunal in April 1984, Egypt claimed that filing arbitration by
Westland against six respondents with different interests was
inappropriate. The arbitral tribunal permitted the beginning of the
proceedings against multiparty respondents by a claimant in a case in
which there was among them "a community at law" or a "claim of the
same character, founded on essentially common cause of substance and
law constitute the subject of the disputes" under the Federal Procedure
Act in accordance with the application of Article 24 of the Swiss
Arbitration Accord, though there were no guidelines in the laws of the
Canton of Geneva or the Swiss Arbitration Accord. The arbitral tribunal
decided that as these conditions were satisfied in this case, it had to allow
multiparty· arbitration. Egypt claimed that Westland contracted with
AOI~ not with the other four countries~ therefore, they were not bound by
the arbitration clause of the contract, nor did they owe any obligation
regarding AOI. The arbitral tribunal, however, decided that under
certain circumstances a party who had not signed an arbitration
agreement is nevertheless bound by it. As the nature of AOI was similar
to a partnership, the partners were bound by the arbitration agreement
which the partnership signed~ therefore, the filing by Westland was
justified, considering the situation in which the four countries established
the Administration Committee and signed a memorandum for a
guarantee with the UK Government.
Excessive intervention by the Swiss court in the Westland case caused
industries to hesitate to pursue arbitration in Switzerland. As an effort
to remedy this situation, Switzerland enacted a new act on international
arbitration in 1987, i.e., it secured the finality of an arbitral award where
an exclusion agreement is expressly stipulated by the contractual parties
in addition to an arbitration clause in the underlying contract. 19
E.

TRENDS IN U.S. CASE LAW

Regarding multiparty arbitration, the trends in case law
federal circuit courts are reviewed here. .

III

the U.S.

In a construction contract, a typical example of multiparty arbitration,

even without a direct expression of "consolidation of arbitration" in
19. Loi federale du 18 decembre 1987 sur Ie droit international prive (LOIP), RO 1988 1776.
The Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law (Dec. 18, 1987).
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either the prime contract or the subcontract, consolidation of arbitration
been allowed in cases through interpretation of other clauses considering
the relationship between the two contracts. In a case in which one clause
of the subcontract stipulated that the subcontractor assumed an
obligation to the contractor under the contract for general conditions,
drawings and specifications, and all obligations which the contractor
assumed to the owner under these documents,20 although the arbitration
clause was not in the subcontract, the prime contract was referred to in
several clauses in Clause 1 of the subcontract, the arbitration clause in
the prime contract was incorporated as a part of the subcontract/I and the
contractor was obligated to submit to arbitration under the prime
contract, the subcontractor was considered to assume "all obligations";
thus the court interpreted and permitted consolidation of arbitration.
Though the arbitration clauses in both the prime contract and the
subcontract stipulate that "no arbitration shall include by consolidation,
joinder or in any other manner, party other than the owner, the contractor
and any other persons substantially involved in a common question of
fact and law, whose presence is required if complete relief is to be
accorded in the arbitration," did not mention consolidation of arbitration
clearly, it was interpreted so that "the inter-related nature of this
construction project, and common questions of law and fact lead the
court to find that the identical arbitration clauses in the agreement
include the duty to arbitrate in one action" and that "while the general
contractor contracted with both the owner and the subcontractor, neither
of whom directly contracted with each other, this formality should not
obscure the dynamic interplay between all these participants in the
venture."22
In a case in which both contracts used the standard form between owner
and architect of the American Institute of Architecture (AlA) for
retaining an architect for supervision of the construction, and the
standard form between owner and contractor of the AlA, stipulated to an
arbitration clause; and the prime-contract clause stipulated that the
owner, the contractor and the "other party who substantially relates to
common issue of fact and law" are the parties to arbitration, and other
clauses before and after those clauses stipulated that "no arbitration ...
shall include, by consolidation, joinder or in any other manner, the
architect, his employees or consultants except by written consent
containing a specific reference to the owner-contractor agreement, and
20.
21.
22.

Uniroyal, Inc. v. A. Epstein and Sons, Inc., 428 F.2d 523 (7th Cir. 1970).
Gavlik Constr. Co. v. H.F. Campbell Co., 526 F.2d 777 (3rd Cir. 1975).
Maxum Found., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 1088 (4th Cir. 1985).
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signed by the architect, the owner, the contractor and any other persons
sought to be joined;"23 the court held that, to the extent the architect did
not agree, it could not enforce arbitration, even with regard to the
architect.
The underlying theory is that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) enforces
private contracts agreed upon by the parties, and it "rigorously enforces
agreements to arbitrate, even if the result is 'piecemeal litigation. '''24
The Second Circuit had allowed the enforcement of consolidation of
arbitration; however, twelve years after the important precedent of the
Nereus case, in the Cable Belt case,25 which was denied certiorari by the
United States Supreme Court, a dispute arising out of a prime contract
and a subcontract related to the same construction, and the issue was
who was responsible for additional costs; the facts and the law of the
dispute were the same. If this dispute were settled by separate
arbitrations, it could lead to inconsistent findings. The Weyerhaeuser
case26 and the Byrd case27 on which the owner relied were wrongly
decided in light of the Nereus case,28 the controlling precedent of the
Second Circuit. Considering the circumstances of this case and the
controlling case law of the Second Circuit, it was apparent that
consolidation of arbitration was required.
F.

CASE LAW OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT

The Nereus case, on which the Cable Belt case relied, and cases from
other circuits criticizing the Nereus case are reviewed below.
The Nereus case of 1975 involved a guarantee agreement to a charterparty, where the agent of the ship owner and the charterer agreed on a
three year charter-party, and a half year later a guarantee agreement was
concluded by three parties including the former two and the guarantor.
The guarantee agreement referred to the charter-party, and when
charterer was in default of the conditions of the charter-party or of
payment, the guarantor agreed to correct the default, and agreed to same
rights and obligations under charter-party. A problem arose due to an oil
cnSlS.

23.
Del E. Webb Constr. V. Richardson Hosp. Auth., 823 F.2d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 1987).
24.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985).
25.
Cable Belt Conveyers v. Alumina Partners, 669 F. Supp. 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd, 857
F.2d 1461 (2d Cir. 1987), cen. denied, 488 U.S. 855 (1987).
26.
Weyerhaeuser CO. V. W. Seas Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1984).
27.
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213.
28.
Compania Espanola de Petroleos V. Nereus Shipping, 527 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1975).
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision
of the district court, which admitted the arbitration agreement as an
interpretation of the guarantee agreement. The guarantee agreement not
only guaranteed the performance of the charterer but also agreed to
correct the default, and agreed to the same rights and obligations under
charter-party. Tqe obligation to arbitrate was one of the rights and
obligations under charter-party which the guarantor undertook.
Consolidation of arbitration as a matter of fairness was demonstrated.
There were common issues of fact and law in two arbitrations, and there
was a risk of conflicting findings regarding the alleged default by the
guarantor. There was case law which allowed the court to consolidate
arbitration under the federal law. This court agrees Articles 42 (a) and
81 (a) (3) of the FRCP apply. This court agreed that the liberal purpose
of the FAA clearly required it to interpret the Act allowing and even
promoting consolidation of arbitration under an appropriate case such as
this. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision ordering
consolidation of arbitration, and amended its decision regarding the
arbitrators so that the three parties selected each arbitrator and the three
chosen arbitrators selected two arbitrators.
In a case in which a dispute arose out of the limitations of loading cargo
during the sublease period of a ship chartered under the time charterparty, the charterer filed a motion to compel consolidation of arbitration
of the ship owner, charterer and sub-charterer, relying on the precedent
of the Nereus case; however, the district court in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. W.
Seas Shipping Co., 568 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1987) dismissed the
motion.
In Weyerhaueser, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held

that a guarantee agreement was an implied agreement of joint arbitration
for the dispute which arose in the Nereus case. However, to the extent
that the case was based on the agreement, it was distinguishable from
this case where there was no agreement by the parties. If the court could
order to compel the consolidation of arbitration even in a case in which
there was no agreement, the court did not wish to follow the case. The
court could .only decide as to whether there was an arbitration agreement,
and if there was an agreement, the court could compel it "according to
the conditions." The only issue in this case was whether there was an
agreement on the consolidation of arbitration among three parties, and
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there was not. Therefore, the Court affirmed the decision of the district
court. 29
In Beasler v. Continental Grain CO.,30 several manufacturers purchased

safflower seeds from Continental Grain Co., and sold back the resulting
crop to Continental using separate contracts, each containing a standard
language. Continental requested a discount and refused to accept some
of the safflower, claiming there were defects in the buds. Pursuant to a
motion filed by Beasler, the district court decided it did not have
authority to order consolidation of the arbitrations hearings, and
subsequently granted Continental's motion for summary judgment.
The issue before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was
whether or not the district court had the authority to consolidate
arbitration when the parties' contract did not stipulate to consolidation of
arbitration in an arbitration clause. The circuits were in conflict; that is,
the Second Circuit held that the source of authority to settle disputes in
an expeditious and economic manner was in the FAA and Rules 42 (a)
and 81 (a) (3) of the FRCP, and the district court had the authority to
consolidate arbitration. The First Circuit decided the issue under the
state act. The Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits held that a district court
did not have the authority to consolidate arbitration based on the purpose
of the FAA and Rule 4 are to secure judicial enforcement of a privately
negotiated arbitration agreement. The Beasler Court followed the
majority of the circuits: if an arbitration agreement does not provide for
consolidation of arbitration, it is considered that the district court lacks
the authority to consolidate arbitration.
The Courts of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit3 ! and the Sixth Circuitl2
decided that where there was no provision for consolidation of
arbitration regarding insurance and reinsurance contracts, a district court
lacked the authority to consolidate arbitration because the court did not
have the authority to circumvent the order of the FAA requiring the
parties "to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the conditions" of
the contract.

29.
30.
31.
1989).
32.

Weyerhaeuser, 743 F.2d at 637.
Beasler v. Cont'l Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1990).
Protective Life Ins. Corp. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Corp., 873 F.2d 281, 282 (8th Cir.
Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 951 F.2d 107, 107 (6th Cir. 1991).
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STATE ARBITRATION ACTS

The joint venture New England Collier Company (NECCO), which was
formed by New England Energy Inc. (NEEI) and Keystone Shipping Co.
(Keystone), owns and operates coal shipping vessels.
NECCO
concluded a charter-party with New England Power Company (NEP), a
sister company of NEEI under the same stockholding company. Each
contract had an arbitration clause. A dispute arose between NEEI and
Keystone regarding the fiduciary duty of the joint venture, and between
NEP and NECCO regarding the fee of the charter party. Each filed for
arbitration. NEEI and NEP filed a motion in state court for the
consolidation of arbitration under the Massachusetts Uniform Arbitration
Act. 33 Keystone filed for transfer of the case to the federal district court
based on diversity of citizenship. The federal district court dismissed the
motion, reasoning that it lacked authority, under the FAA and U.S.
Supreme Court case law, to consolidate arbitration unless there was a
provision for consolidation of arbitration in the parties' contract. It was
implied that the FAA preempted the Massachusetts Arbitration Act,
which stipulated for consolidation of arbitration, and the FAA deprived
the court of the authority to order the consolidation of arbitration under
Rule 42 (a) of the PRCP. 34
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit decided that a court may
order the consolidation of arbitration under the Massachusetts
Arbitration Act, after carefully reviewing the U.S. Supreme Court case
law and considering the FAA policy. It was not necessary to decide
whether a federal court may order the consolidation of arbitration under
Rule 42 (a) of the PRCP in the case where the state act does not stipulate
to the consolidation of arbitration. The court did not hold that the FAA
does not preempt all state acts regarding arbitration, even where the FAA
applies to the arbitration agreement. There was no preemptive issue
between the FAA and the Massachusetts Arbitration Act, which
stipulates to the consolidation of arbitration. As the FAA does not
stipulate to the consolidation of arbitration, the Massachusetts
Arbitration Act did not conflict with the provisions of the FAA.

33. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 251, § 2A (West 2003) (The relevant part of the Act is that a
party aggrieved by the failure or refusal of another to agree to consolidate one arbitration proceeding
with another or others, for which the method of appointment of the arbitrator or arbitrators is the
same... may apply to the superior court for an order such consolidation ... [T]he issue shall be
decided under the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure governing consolidation and severance of
trials and the court shall issue an order accordingly. No provision in any arbitration agreement
shall bar or present action by the court under this section).
34. New England Energy Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1,3 (lst Cir. 1988).
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Recent case law of the U.S. Supreme Court holds that state acts aimed at
expediting the settlement of disputes do not conflict with the FAA
policy. The consolidation of arbitration provision of the Massachusetts
Arbitration Act does not limit "the principle of compelling" a private
arbitration agreement. The state act only calls for more efficient
arbitration procedures. The appellant asserted that the arbitration clause
of "pursuant to the law relating to arbitration in enforce" in the City of
Boston expressed the intent to consolidate arbitration. The arbitration act
enforced in the City of Boston included not only the FAA but also the
provision of consolidation of arbitration of the Massachusetts Arbitration
Act. The court did not need to decide based upon the provision of the
contract; the agreement was not the premise of the application of the
provision of consolidation of arbitration of the Massachusetts Arbitration
Act. Therefore, the court examined whether the district court correctly
decided if two arbitrations were in accordance with the requirements of
consolidation of arbitration. The Massachusetts Arbitration Act permits
the consolidation of arbitration where there is a common question of law
and fact, in accordance with the FAA.
The facts of the case were that regarding the fee of the charter-party
between and New England Power and NECCO, Keystone claimed that
New England Energy breached the fiduciary duty it owed to Keystone
since New England Energy could decide the fee of the charter-party in
his favor with two voting rights. Keystone had only one voting right in
the joint venture NECCO. Such decision led to the preferential interest
of charter-party New England Power, a sister company of New England
Energy under the same stockholding company. Both arbitrations related
to settlement of the fee issue. There was a risk of reaching conflicting
results by separate arbitrations. The court held that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in concluding that the arbitrations should be
consolidated.
H.

THE TREND TOWARD UNIFYING DECISIONS OF THE U.S. CIRCUIT
COURTS

The First Circuit has held that the district court has the authority to
consolidate arbitration when the state arbitration act particularly
authorizes it, and in this regard, the FAA does not preempt a state
arbitration act.
The Second Circuit had held that a court may compel consolidation of
arbitration in order to settle disputes in an expeditious and economic
manner; however, the law was changed by the Boeing case as mentioned
above.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol9/iss1/9
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Other circuits have held that the FAA stipulates to arbitration based on
an arbitration agreement, and the court may not compel the consolidation
of arbitration unless there is agreement to consolidate. These courts
reached decisions by considering how the U.S. Supreme Court interprets
the FAA. That is, as the FAA intended to overturn the historic judicial
refusal to compel an arbitration agreement, the court is not permitted to
intervene in a private agreement "in order to impose its own view of
speed and economy." 35 It is so interpreted, even if separate proceedings
prove to be inefficient. The U.S. Supreme Court has clearly denied the
assertion that the purpose of the FAA is to expedite the settlement of
claims. Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the enactment of
the FAA was primarily intended by Congress to compel the parties'
agreement;36 and according to this purpose, the FAA has been interpreted
to require the federal courts to compel an arbitration agreement reached
by the parties. Unless there is an agreement to consolidate arbitration,
the court does not have the authority to compel arbitration.
In this writer's opinion as to party autonomy in commercial arbitration,
the trend of U.S. case law which allows for the consolidation of
arbitration in multiparty arbitration where the parties have expressed
their intention to do so, or it can be interpreted as such, is a welcome
development.
Regarding whether the FAA has two purposes of compelling private
agreements and of promoting the quick and efficient settlement of
claims, or whether the former supersedes the latter, there is an opinion3?
which admits two purposes and if appropriate, allows a court to compel
consolidation of arbitration, even if there is no agreement to do so;
however, that opinion also admits that there is a uniform rule in the U.S.
for not compelling the consolidation of arbitration unless there is an
agreement to do so.

I.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

1.

Cases Denied Certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court

Of the federal circuit court cases reviewed in the previous sections,
Nereus (2nd Cir.1976), Weyerhauser (9th Cir. 1984), Cable Belt (2nd
Cir.1987) and New England (lst Cir.1989) were appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court, but all were denied certiorari. As a result, the Supreme
35. Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 951 F.2d. at 108.
36. Beasler, 900 F.2d at 1195; Byrd. 470 U.S. at 220.
37. Richard. E. Wallas, Jr., Consolidated Arbitration in the United States: Recent Authority
Requires Consent of the Parties, 10 J.INT'L. ARB. 4, 5 (1993).
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Court has not expressed an opinion on these cases, so differences in case
law in the federal circuit courts have not been resolved.
Therefore, with the exception of the First Circuit which permits
consolidation of arbitration based on a state act, there are two lines of
case law; the Second Circuit Court permitted the consolidation of
arbitration even without an agreement, and the other circuits do not
permit the consolidation of arbitration without an agreement by the
parties. In the Boeing case, the Second Circuit decided by overruling its
own precedent, that the parties' agreement on the consolidation of
arbitration is required, as mentioned above. Boeing referred to three
cases of the Supreme Court which are not directly related to the
consolidation of arbitration. Boeing examined these cases as to how the
Supreme Court considers arbitration, and decided to overrule Nereus, as
precedent for the Second Circuit. These Supreme Court cases are briefly
reviewed below.
The Moses Case38 of 1983

2.

This case involved the constructing additions onto a hospital building in
North Carolina.
An architectural fIrm designed and supervised
construction, which was contracted to Mercury, a fIrm from Alabama.
The construction contract contained an arbitration clause to the effect
that all disputes involving interpretation of the contract or performance
of the construction work were to be referred to in the fIrst instance to the
Architect. With certain stated exceptions, any dispute decided by the
Architect (or not decided by it within a stated time) could be submitted
by either party to binding arbitration under the Rules of Arbitration of
the Construction Industry of the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) within a specifIed period. There was no arbitration agreement
between the hospital and the architect. During the construction period,
disputes arose regarding the increase of costs and expenses of
construction by Mercury due to delay or nonfeasance by the hospital.
(Issues in the case concerned an order to stay litigation and
appealability).
The U.S. Supreme Court held that under the FAA, an arbitration
agreement shall be enforced irrespective of the existence of a third party
who is a party to the underlying contract disputes but is not a party to the
arbitration agreement. 39

38.
39.

Moses H. Cone Mem'! Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. I (1983).
Moses, 460 U.S. at 20.
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The Byrd Case40 of 1985

3.

The case involved the purchase of securities in the amount of $160,000
by Byrd through a broker-dealer. The value of the securities decreased
by more than $100,000 one half of a year later. Byrd filed an action in
the federal district court against the broker-dealer under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. The broker-dealer filed a motion to compel
arbitration of the pendant state claims under the arbitration clause of the
Customer Agreement, and to stay arbitration until resolution of the
federal action. The District Court dismissed the filing and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.
The Supreme Court discussed the legislative history of the FAA, stating
that the purpose of its enactment was to ensure the judicial enforcement
of privately negotiated arbitration agreements. The court denied the
suggestion that the purpose of the FAA was to promote the expedited
solution of claims. The FAA does not, after all, order arbitration of all
claims, but orders arbitration only upon application by the parties for the
The
enforcement of privately negotiated arbitration agreements.
Congressional Report for the enactment of the FAA makes clear that the
purpose of the FAA is to give arbitration agreements the same status as
other contracts, and also to overrule the longstanding judicial refusal of
enforcing arbitration agreements. The Court was not persuaded by the
argument that the conflict between the two purposes of the FAA; the
enforcement of private arbitration agreements and the promotion of
efficient and expedited solutions of claims, should be settled in favor of
the latter in order to realize the intent of the drafters of the Act. The
particular interest of Congress at the time of the enactment of the FAA
was to enforce private agreements by the parties, and that interest
requires courts to rigidly enforce arbitration agreements. As to the extent
of the conflicting policy, other federal law is not made clear, even if the
result is 'piecemeal' litigation. 41
The Volt Information Case42 of 1989

4.

This case involves the construction of underground electric conduits on a
University campus. The contract, using the American Institute of
Architecture (AlA) Standard Form (AlA 201), contained both an
arbitration and choice-of-Iaw clause (law of the place where the project
is located). A dispute arose relating to the payment of additional work.
40.
41.
42.

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221.
Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2003

23

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 9 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 9

212

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW

[Vol. 9:1

The Supreme Court held that the FAA required the court to enforce the
privately negotiated arbitration agreement like any other contract in
accordance with the conditions of the agreement. Arbitration under the
FAA was a matter of consent, not a matter of enforcement; generally, the
parties may freely structure an arbitration agreement as they consider
appropriate. 43
Regarding the choice of governing law, the court stated, in a footnote,
that the FAA itself does not contain particular provisions to deal with the
special practical problems that arise in multiparty contractual disputes
when some or all of the contracts at issue include agreements to
arbitrate. 44
J.

AGREEMENTS ON MULTIPARTY ARBITRATION

As is clear from the previous discussion, when the parties wish to
arbitrate disputes by multiparty arbitration, they must make their
agreement to do so clear.
Regarding construction contracts, citing one example of multiparty
arbitration by the owner, contractor and subcontractor, there are two
methods for agreeing to multiparty arbitration; the first is agreement by
the three parties, and the second is agreement by each of two parties,
i.e., the prime contract between the owner and contractor stipulates the
multiparty arbitration clause, and the subcontract between the contractor
and subcontractor also stipulates to a multiparty arbitration clause.
An example of the selection of the clauses to be stipulated to in the prime
contract and subcontract are attached to the ENAA Model Form
International Contract for Process Plant Construction drafted by the
Japan Engineering Advancement Association (ENAA);45 that is, (A) as to
the arbitration clause in the prime contract, when the contractor makes
the subcontract, the intention of multiparty arbitration and its draft clause
is to stipulate that if any dispute or difference to be referred to arbitration
under the prime contract, (i) raises issues which are substantially the
same as or connected with issues raised in any dispute between
contractor and subcontractor, (ii) arises out of substantially the same
facts as are the subject of any dispute between contractor and
subcontractor, or (iii) is such that the owner and contractor declare that a
dispute or difference between the contractor and subcontractor to be one
43.
Jd. at 479.
44.
Jd. at 476, n.5.
45.
ENAA Model Fonn International Contract for Process Plant Construction, Yol.3, Guide
Notes. The writer of this paper was one of the drafting members of the ENAA.
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of interest to them in connection with the resolution of any dispute or
difference under the prime contract, the owner and contractor agree that
the contractor may refer any related dispute as is mentioned in (i) or (ii)
above, and that the contractor shall refer any related dispute as is
mentioned in (iii) above, to the arbitral tribunal. The arbitral tribunal
shall have the power to make all necessary directions as to the joinder of
the parties as the arbitral tribunal considers appropriate to achieve such
purpose, and any award made by such arbitral tribunal shall be final and
binding. (B) As to the arbitration clause in the subcontract, (i) and (ii)
are to stipulate replacing the subcontract by the prime contract, and (iii)
is to stipulate to the relationship of the prime-contract; thereby
establishing three-party relationships.
K.

SUMMARY ON MULTIPARTY ARBITRATION

Multiparty arbitration is allowed in cases in which interested parties
agree to arbitrate in one arbitral procedure, or their agreements are so
construed (as in the Erith case of the UK). Under the governing law,
when multiparty arbitration is enforced (as by the Massachusetts
Arbitration Act), it must be followed, but in other cases, the parties'
agreement is respected. Party autonomy is recognized in this area.
Regarding selection of the arbitrator, under the Dutco case of France and
arbitration procedures, selection of the same number of arbitrators as that
of the parties is not considered appropriate because the arbitrator is not
the representative of the party but is impartial and independent of the
party. In multiparty arbitration, if the claimants or respondents do not
agree on one arbitrator each, they may make a rule that the arbitration
institution is given the authority to appoint at its discretion one arbitrator
for the party who disagrees. This is analogous to a case in which the
parties cannot agree on one arbitrator, and the arbitration institution is
given authority to appoint an arbitrator under arbitration rules. 46 Does
equality of the parties for selection of an arbitrator refer only to selection
of the same number of arbitrators as of the parties? EqUality of the
parties ensures the opportunity for each party to participate in selecting
the arbitrator, considering the status, nature, and function of the arbitrator
as impartial and independent.
In the above section, which reviewed relatively recent cases, the focus
has been on agreements as to multiparty arbitration. It may be
preferable to clarify agreements for multiparty arbitration where there
46.
1988 INT'L. CHAMBER COM. R. ARB., art. 9 (Appointment and Continnation of the
Arbitrators); 2001 AM. ARB. ASSN. INT'L ARB. R., art. 6(5).
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are many parties to several related contracts of which the purpose is the
same; thereby leading to efficient settlement of disputes and nonconflicting awards. The principle of party autonomy may underlie the
scheme.

HI. CLASSWIDE ARBlTRATION
A.

INTRODUCTION

Article 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) requires the federal courts
to enforce arbitration agreements as agreed by the parties. On the other
hand, the Court of Appeal of the State of California in the Blue Cross
case47 decided on October 6, 1998 that class-wide arbitration can be
compelled under the California Code of Civil Procedure48 where the
parties did not agree to arbitrate, and the Code is not preempted by the
FAA. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Blue Cross case
on June 14, 1999.49
The U.S. Supreme Court has not expressed its opinion as to whether the
FAA precludes classwide arbitration under the Act of the State of
California. The term "classwide arbitration" is used by the Supreme
Court of the State of California5<l as the counterpart of class action in
litigation
The provision of the California Code of Civil Procedure on which the
California Supreme Court based its decision in Blue Cross is that of
consolidation of arbitration, and it refers to cases of consolidation of
arbitration, in particular, cases of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit cases based on the Act of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
which has provisions on consolidation of arbitration. 51
On the other hand, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
held that it cannot order certification of a class for an arbitration
proceeding unless the class action arbitration is not agreed in the

47.

Blue Cross of Cal. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779 (Ct. App. 1998).
CAL. ClY. PROC. CODE §1281.3 (West 2003).
Blue Cross of Cal., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, em. denied, 527 U.S. 1003 (1999).
50.
Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982). Blue Cross 01 Cal. , 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 785 n.2.
5 I.
Blue Cross of Cal., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 789-90; New England Energy Inc., 855 F.2d at 4-5.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, § 2A (West 2003). Unifonn Arbitration Act for Commercial
Disputes - Consolidation or Severance of Arbitration Proceedings.

48.
49.
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arbitration agreement of the parties, 52 and this upholds the precedents of
the Circuit after Blue Cross was decided. 53
The cases regarding the necessity of an agreement on class wide
arbitration will be examined in state and federal courts, as they were with
consolidation of multiparty arbitration. It is also necessary to examine
the substance of the arbitration agreement with regard to agreement on
classwide arbitration. 54
B.

THE BLUE CROSS CASE

The facts of this case are that F and W concluded an agreement on health
plans with Blue Cross. The parties stipulated to such conditions as preexisting conditions, waiting period exclusions, waived condition
exclusions, and temporary exclusions. F and W claimed that these
exclusions were illegal, and filed a class action in the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, California. Blue Cross counterclaimed that the
dispute had to be settled under the arbitration clause in the plans.
Though there were some differences in the arbitration clause depending
on the plan, "Any dispute or claim, of whatever nature, arising out of, in
connection with, or in relation to this Agreement or breach thereof, or in
connection to care or delivery of care, including any claim based on
contract, tort or statute, must be resolved by arbitration if the amount
sought exceeds the jurisdictional limit of the small claims court. The
arbitration findings will be final and binding except to the extent that
California or federal law provided for the judicial review of arbitration
proceeding." Blue Cross filed a petition in the trial court to compel
arbitration of the individual plaintiffs claim and to stay litigation. The
trial court granted Blue Cross's petition to compel arbitration, but denied
its motion to stay litigation as a whole, and discovery continued as to
class claims for purposes of a possible class certification motion. If a
class were certified, the class claims would be referred to class wide
arbitration. The court concluded that the arbitration provision at issue,
drafted by Blue Cross, was one of adhesion.
Blue Cross appealed to the California Court of Appeals claiming that the
trial court erred in denying the motion to stay the judicial action as a
whole, because the FAA preempts California law allowing for classwide
arbitration. The California Court of Appeals did not address an issue
52.
53.
54.
agenda,

Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995).
Iowa Grain v. Brown, 171 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 1999).
The American Bar Association (ABA) at the 1998 Annual Meeting Business Law Section
Consumer Bankruptcy, Consumer Credit Services (Aug.3, 1998 at Toronto), CONFERENCE
REPORT, 67 U.S.L.W. 2089 (8-18-89) relates to this issue. But reference is not made in this paper.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2003

27

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 9 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 9

216

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW

[Vol. 9:1

which Blue Cross had not raised in its petition specifically concerning
the court limited discovery order or its finding the arbitration provision
was one of adhesion, but stated that the sole question the court had to
consider was whether the act prohibited class wide arbitration in this case.
The court scrutinized the precedents regarding the relationships between
the FAA and the state act, and concluded that the California classwide
arbitration rule was not preempted by the FAA.
C.

THE KEATING CASE

The main precedent for class wide arbitration in California is the Keating
case55 decided by the California Supreme Court. The issue of class wide
arbitration, one of several issues in the case, is discussed below.
An arbitration clause in a franchise agreement stated that any
controversy or claim arising out of or relating to the agreement or the
breach thereof shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules
of the American Arbitration Association (AAA), and judgment upon any
award rendered by the arbitrator may be entered in any court having
jurisdiction thereof.
Four franchisees individually filed an action, between September 1975
and January 1977, in the superior court of Alameda County, California,
against the franchisor, alleging fraud, misrepresentation, breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the disclosure
requirements of the Franchise Investment Law. The defendant filed an
answer, but did not allege there was the arbitration clause in the
agreement. In May 1977, Keating, a franchisee, filed a class action on
behalf of about 800 franchisees in California, alleging claims
substantially similar to other claims and also unfair and inaccurate
accounting procedures of the defendant. The defendant filed a motion to
remove the case to federal court, and a few days later filed an amended
answer asserting arbitration as a defense. When the case remained in
state court at the plaintiff s request, the defendant petitioned to compel
arbitration in all pending cases. The trial court granted the defendant's
motion to compel arbitration without ruling on the plaintiffs request for
class certification, except for the claims under the Franchise Investment
Law. Upon appeal by the defendant, the California Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court's decision to compel arbitration of the claims
under the Franchise Investment Law, which did not invalidate arbitration
agreements, and ordered the trial court to conduct class certification
proceedings. The defendant appealed to the California Supreme Court,
55.

Keating. 645 P.2d at 1206-10.
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and the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the
case to the trial court for consideration of the appellees' request for class
certification.
The California Supreme Court held as follows:
Keating stated that the franchise agreement was given to it by
Southland, the franchisor, with no opportunity to negotiate and
no explanation of the arbitration agreement. The franchise
agreements were standard in form at least as regards the
arbitration provision; however, it did not follow that the contract
was unenforceable. To describe a contract as adhesive in
character is not to indicate its legal effect. A contract of
adhesion is fully enforceable according to its terms unless certain
other factors, such as a contract or a provision, does not fall
within the reasonable expectations of the weaker party, or a
contract or provision is unduly oppressive or unconscionable. A
provision for arbitration in a commercial context is quite
common, and reasonably to be anticipated. Keating knew the
arbitration provision and the AAA pamphlet-making reference to
the applicable rules. In that situation, neither Keating nor the
other franchisees were in a position to claim that the arbitration
provision itself, or the fact that it would entail a waiver of jury
trial, did not fall within their reasonable expectations. Thus, the
California Supreme Court concluded that the arbitration
provisions of the franchise agreement were, in general, binding
and enforceable. 56
The apparent purpose of the FAA was to remove judicial hostility to
arbitration generally, and to make the benefits of arbitration generally
available to the business world. In this respect, California law is entirely
in accord. In 1927, two years after the FAA was enacted, California
adopted its first modern arbitration statute, declaring arbitration
agreements to be irrevocable and enforceable in terms identical to those
in Section 2 of the federal act, and since that time California courts and
its legislature have consistently reflected a friendly policy toward the
arbitration process.
The trial court did not expressly rule on the motion by Keating for class
certification. The franchisees contended that if arbitration were to
proceed, the trial court should be instructed to determine the preliminary
56.

Id.
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issues regarding class certification so that it could proceed on a
classwide basis. California courts have repeatedly emphasized the
importance of the class action device for vindicating rights asserted by
large groups of persons. As the parties acknowledge, there is an absence
of direct authority either supporting or rejecting classwide arbitration,
but analogous authority exists with respect to the consolidation of
arbitration proceedings. The FAA does not specifically provide for
consolidated arbitration, but courts have frequently ordered consolidated
arbitration proceedings when the interests of justice so require, either
because the issues in dispute are substantially the same and/or because a
substantial right might be prejudiced if separate arbitration proceedings
are conducted.
An order for classwide arbitration in an adhesion context would call for
considerably less intrusion upon the contractual aspects of a relationship.
The members of a class subject to classwide arbitration would all be
parties to an agreement with a party against whom their claim is asserted;
each of those agreements would contain substantially the same
arbitration provision; and if any members of the class were dissatisfied
with the class representative or with the choice of arbitrator, or would
prefer to arbitrate on their own, they would be free to opt out and do so.
The interest of justice be served by ordering classwide arbitration is
likely to be even more substantial in some cases than the interests that
are thought to justify consolidation. The court concluded that it had the
authority to do so.
A judiciaJly ordered classwide arbitration would entail a greater degree
of judicial involvement than is normally associated with arbitration. The
court would have to make initial determinations regarding certification
and notice to the class, and if class wide arbitration proceeds it may be
called upon to exercise a measure of external supervision in order to
safeguard the rights of absent class members to adequate representation
in the event of dismissal or settlement. Classwide arbitration must be
evaluated, not in relation to some ideal, but in relation to its alternatives.
If the alternative in a case of this sort is to enforce hundreds of individual
franchisees each to litigate its cause with a franchisor in a separate
arbitral forum, then the prospect of class wide arbitration, for all its
difficulties, may offer a better, more efficient, and fairer solution. Where
that is so, and gross unfairness would result from the denial of an
opportunity to proceed on a class wide basis, then an or~r structuring
arbitration on that basis would be justified.
Whether such an order would be justified in a case of this sort is a
question appropriately left to the discretion of the trial court. In making
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol9/iss1/9
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that determination, the trial court would be called upon to consider not
only the factors normally relevant to class certification, but the special
characteristics of arbitration as well, including the impact upon an
arbitration proceeding of whatever court supervision might be required,
and the availability of consolidation as an alternative means of assuring
fairness. Whether classwide proceedings would prejudice the legitimate
interest of the party which drafted the adhesion agreement must also be
considered, and that party should be given the option of remaining in
court rather than submitting to classwide arbitration.
In this case, the trial court did not consider the franchisees' request for
class wide arbitration at all, and a fortiori did not consider the factors
which the court found to be relevant. Since they were unable to make
the determination on this record as a matter of law, the case was
remanded to the trial court on this issue. The California Supreme Court
had interpreted the Franchise Investment Law to require judicial
consideration of claims brought under the California statute, and held it
did not contravene the Federal Act. The court then remanded the case to
the trial court for consideration of the appellees' request for classwide
arbitration.
The Southland appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which considered
two issues: (a) Whether the California Franchise Investment Law, which
invalidates certain arbitration agreements covered by the FAA, violates
the Supremacy Clause; and (b) whether arbitration under the federal act
is impaired when a class action structure is imposed on the process by a
state court. The U.S. Supreme Court held as follows: The FAA created a
body of federal substantive rules applicable in state as well as federal
courts, thereby the Congress intended to foreclose State legislative
attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements. 57
Regarding the first issue, the Court held that section 31512 of the
California Franchise Investment Law violates the Supremacy Clause.
Regarding the latter issue, the California Supreme Court ruled that
imposing a class action structure on the arbitration process was
permissible as a matter of state law, but the record did not show that the
California Supreme Court ruled on the question of whether
superimposing class action procedures on a contract arbitration was
57.
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. I (1984) (Do not confuse with Keating v. Superior
Court, 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982)). See also, Doctor's Associate, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681
(1984) (The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Montana Supreme Court, holding on
the State first-page notice requirement).
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contrary to the federal act. As to the question of whether the FAA
precludes class action arbitration, and other issues not raised in the
California courts, no decision was appropriate. The case was remanded
for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion.
D.

THE U.S. SEVENTH CIRCUIT CASES

1.

The Iowa Grain Case

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of lllinois held that in
the Iowa Grain case,58 which involved a waiver of the right to arbitrate,
class action arbitration may not proceed unless the parties clearly agreed
on it. The Court followed the precedent of the Seventh Circuit, even
after the California Supreme Court allowed classwide arbitration in the
Blue Cross case.
In the Iowa Grain case, Brown and Miller, both customers of Iowa Grain

Co., lost substantial sums of money trading commodities through an
Iowa Grain guaranteed broker. Brown and Miller then filed a class
action lawsuit against the defendant company in the U.S. District Court
for the District of South Carolina, alleging that the broker had violated
federal and state securities laws, as well as, the federal Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. Iowa Grain filed a
motion to enforce the forum-selection clause of the Customer
Agreement, requiring all causes of action to be brought in Cook County,
lllinois courts. Finding the forum-selection clause valid, the South
Carolina Court dismissed the action.
In addition to filing a motion for reconsideration and clarification, Brown

and Miller also individually filed for arbitration at the American
Arbitration Association (AAA) in the State of South Carolina. A class
representative was not designated. Iowa Grain filed a suit in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of lllinois alleging that Brown
and Miller waived their right to arbitrate as a result of their filing suit in
the District of South Carolina.
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of lllinois rejected Iowa
Grain's allegation, reasoning that since class actions cannot be arbitrated
absent an explicit agreement, Brown and Miller did not act inconsistently
with their contractual obligation to arbitrate by filing the class action and
thus there was no waiver. The Court directed the parties to pursue their
disputes in arbitration proceedings under the agreement.
58.

Iowa Grain, 171 F.3d at 504.
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On appeal by Iowa Grain, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the District Court decision, reasoning that the arbitration
agreement signed by the Brown and Miller did not contain a
consolidation clause or a provision for class treatment. The District
Court interpreted the customers' intent in filing the South Carolina action
as an effort to structure the case -- change its shape -- which was
fundamentally incompatible with arbitration. It declined to infer waiver
from this course of conduct. Finding that the customers had diligently
pursued their arbitration rights by filing their demand promptly after the
South Carolina Court dismissed the class suit, and filing a timely motion
to compel arbitration in the declaratory judgment action, the Court
ordered the arbitration to proceed. The District Court correctly looked at
the totality of the circumstances before it and decided that no waiver had
occurred. Iowa Grain had not shown that the District Court clearly erred
when it found that the customers had not waived their right to arbitrate.
2.

The Siegel Trading Case

Customers Perera and Champ filed several claims under the Commodity
Exchange Act and the RICO Act against the defendant, Siegel Trading
Co., in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of lllinois. Siegel
filed a motion to proceed to arbitration of these claims, and Perera filed a
motion for class certification. The District Court granted the defendant's
motion to compel arbitration of Perera's claim, but refused to compel
arbitration of Champ's claim, and later certified Perera as a class
representative for arbitration. Upon Siegel's motion for reconsideration,
five months later the court revoked its certification of Perera as a class
representative, and held that it lacked authority to certify a class
arbitration where the parties had not agreed to such procedure in their
arbitration agreement. The court determined that as Perera's and
Champ's claims were distinct,59 they wereto proceed in a separate forum.
On appeal by the plaintiff, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 60 The court found no
meaningful basis to distinguish between the failure to provide for
consolidation and class arbitration. The court adopted the rational of
several other circuits61 and held that Section 4 of the FAA forbids federal
judges from ordering class arbitration where the parties' arbitration
agreement is silent on the matter. The U.S. Supreme Court has
59.
Perera v. Siegel Trading Co., 951 F.2d 780 (7 th Cir. 1992). Champ, 55 F.3d at 269 (7 th Cir.
1995).
Id.
60.
61. Boeing, 998 F.2d 68; Del E. Webb Contsr., 823 F.2d 145; Am. Cent 'I Ins. ,951 F.2d 107;
Beasler, 900 F.2d 1193; Weyerhaeuser, 743 F.2d 635; Protective Life Ins., 873 F.2d 281.
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repeatedly emphasized that the Federal Courts must rigorously enforce
the parties' agreement as written, even if the result is "piecemeal"
litigation.62 Rule 81(a) (3) only applies to judicial proceedings under the
FAA, not to the actual proceedings before the arbitration panel. This
means that absent an express provision in the arbitration agreement
requiring class arbitration, the District Court would not be able to invoke
Rule 81(a)(3) as a source of authority to certify a class arbitration under
Rule 23. The order of the district court denying class certification was
affirmed.
E.

AGREEMENTS ON CLASS WIDE ARBITRAnON

The California courts have decided that class wide arbitration is
enforceable by California statute, so that an agreement by the parties on
classwide arbitration is not needed. On the other hand, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit requires the parties' agreement on
c1asswide arbitration as is required in general principle in an arbitration
agreement.
In the California Blue Cross case, the court did not apply the theory of
the Siegel Trading case of the Seventh Circuit, but it applied the New
England Energy case of the First Circuit, which was said to be more

suited to its facts and better reasoned. 63 In the latter case, the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts statute allowed the consolidation of
arbitration even if there was no agreement as to consolidation.
The basis of the California statute is California Code of Civil Procedure
section 1281.3,64 which stipulates that a party to an arbitration agreement
may petition the court to consolidate separate arbitration proceedings,
and the court may order consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings
when: (a) separate arbitration agreements or proceedings exist between
the same parties; or one party is a party to a separate arbitration
agreement or proceedings with a third party; (b) the disputes arise from
the same transactions or series of related transactions; and (c) there are
common issues of law or fact creating the possibility of conflicting
rulings by more than one arbitrator or panel of arbitrators.
Both the California and Massachusetts statutes contain provisions on
consolidation of arbitration agreements. The FAA does not stipulate to
the consolidation of arbitration. Consolidation is not identical to class
62.
63.
64.

Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221.
Blue Cross of Cal., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 790.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.3 (West 2003).
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treatment. Upon a claim of class wide arbitration, courts apply the same
basis and theory of consolidation of arbitration to consider whether to
conclude to the same effect. 65
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (PRCP) section 81(a)(3),66
stipulates that these rules apply only to the extent that matters of
procedure are not provided for in those statutes. Rule 42(a) stipulates to
consolidation so that "when actions involving a common question of law
or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial
of any or all the matters in issue in the actions [or] it may order all the
actions consolidated." Rule 23(a) states the prerequisites to a class
action that "one or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class,
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interest of the Class."
Whereas these PRCP rules supplement the deficit of provisions on
consolidation in the FAA and become the basis for the consolidation of
arbitration,67 the FAA only enforces an arbitration agreement in
accordance with the terms the parties agreed upon. 68 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that a court cannot order class
arbitration when the parties' arbitration agreement is silent on the matter.
The circuit courts are divided as to whether to allow class arbitration. As
to state courts, both California and Pennsylvania allow for class
arbitration.
The Pennsylvania case which allowed class wide arbitration is the
Dickler case. 69 In the Dickler case, the court allowed classwide
arbitration, but reversed because it did not allow certification of a class,
and remanded to the trial court for class certification proceedings,
holding that the court must compel arbitration for the class if it has been
certified. 70 It is clear from this that the court was involved in the
certification proceedings.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

70.

Garnmaro v. Thorp Consumer Disc. Co., 828 F. Supp. 673, 674 (D. Minn. 1993).
FED. R. CIY. P. 23(a), 42(a), 81(a)(3).
Keating, 645 P.2d at 1208.
9 U.S.C. § 4 (2003).
Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 596 A.2d 860 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
Id. at 861.
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The facts are that the Dale Dickler and others similarly situated (the
"Dickler Group") purchased securities from Shearson, but Shearson
failed to deliver the securities or pay dividends. The Dickler Group filed
a suit, individually and as class representatives, against Shearson in the
Court of Common Plea (Philadelphia), alleging breach of fiduciary duty,
breach of contract and tortious conversion. Shearson filed a motion to
stay claims and compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement.
The Dickler Group amended the claims to include equitable relief and
argued that the claims were not arbitrable because of the request for
equitable relief. Shearson argued that the agreement was broad enough
to address all disputes. The trial court ruled that the dispute presented
was outside the terms of the Shearson-client agreement, and equitable
relief cannot be awarded through arbitration. Shearson filed an appeal to
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. The Superior Court held that the
amended Uniform Arbitration Act allows an arbitrator to declare
injunctive relief, and the Shears on client agreement was comprehensive
enough and encompassed equitable relief. The trial court erred in
refusing to compel arbitration.
The Dickler Group raised a concern that if each customer was relegated
to individually proceeding in arbitration only, the costs involved would
effectively bar most, if not all, from obtaining the relief to which they
were entitled and this class action sought to achieve. The court agreed
with the California Court of Appeal, which was the first to allow class
actions in arbitration proceedings.?! The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has given approval at least to the concept of class action arbitration
proceedings, although it has· never ruled on the applicability of such
procedures when the arbitration agreement does not specifically call for
it. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a class action claim before
the State's Board of Arbitration of Claims was proper.72
In finding that the arbitration agreement by the parties encompassed a

class action dispute, the court was merely giving full weight to the
wording of agreement of "any controversy." The availability of class
suits in arbitration proceedings precludes either party from being forced
to litigate in a position less advantageous than that for which they
contracted. The Court reversed the trial court and remanded for class
certification proceedings. The Court must compel arbitration if a class
has been certified, or individually if it has not been certified.

71.
Keating, 645 P.2d at 1208.
72.
Stevenson v. Com. Dept. of Revenue, 413 A.2d 667 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); PA. R. CIY. P.
170 1-16 (class action rule).
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In the State of New York, the state courts decided that arbitration was
deemed a special proceeding, and special proceedings may be
consolidated whenever it can be done without prejudice to substantial
rights, even without the parties' consent.73 The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, which is situated in the State of New York, has also
decided that arbitrations may be consolidated by the court unless the
parties agree in their agreement;74 however, in the Boeing case75 the court
held that unless the parties agree to consolidation of arbitration, they may
not consolidate separate arbitration proceedings.
Before the decision of the Boeing case by the Second Circuit, the
decisions of the federal circuits were split; as mentioned above, the Fifth,
Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have decided that
consolidation of arbitration proceedings may not be compelled unless the
parties have agreed. 76 The Seventh Circuit joined this line in the Siegel
case.

N. CONCLUSION
. Although both multiparty and classwide arbitrations are available based
on the same theory of consolidation of arbitration, the arbitrations may
be difficult to handle in the same procedure.
With regard to multiparty arbitration, there may be as many as ten parties
who have contractual relationships with each other, and the contracts are
closely related.
With classwide arbitration, as in a class action, many parties are involved
in the proceedings, and there are many issues to be solved, such as
certification of members, notice to members, representation,
identification of members, opt out from the proceedings, treatment of a
non-member, and application of the award to a non-member.
A clearly written arbitration agreement allows parties to delegate dispute
settlement authority to a private arbitrator. Contracting parties agree on
arbitration with the expectation of flexibility, expeditiousness and
73.
Symphony Fab. Corp. v. Bernson Silk Mills, 12 N.Y.2d 409 (1963); Bock v. Drexel
Burnham Lambert, Inc., 541 N.Y.S.2d 172 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (Special proceedings may be
consolidated whenever it can be done without prejudice to substantial right); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7502
(2002).
74.
Nereus, 527 F.2d at 966.
75.
Boeing, 998 F.2d at 69
Boeing, 998 F.2d 68; Del E. Webb Contsr., 823 F.2d 145; Am. Cent'llns., 951 F.2d 107;
76.
Beasler, 900 F.2d 1193; Weyerhaeuser, 743 F.2d 635; Protective Life Ins., 873 F.2d 28; Champ, 55
F.3d at 276.
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privacy. If the parties try to perform up to the substantive terms of the
contract, and also attempt to settle disputes, to the extent possible, in
accordance with the contractual terms regarding the settlement of
disputes, then expanding the scope of the party autonomy is welcomed.
The tendency of U.S. case law also seems favorable to this view.
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